

## *Chapter Twenty-Two*

# **Archipelagic Feeling**

## *Counter-mapping Indigeneity and Diaspora in the Trans-Pacific*

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In this chapter, I explore the analytical potential of archipelagic studies for inspiring decolonial struggles in the Trans-Pacific region. Specifically, I examine the archipelagic formation of Japanese imperialism, along with the indigenous and diasporic subjectivities that are subsumed under the myth of ethnic homogeneity promoted by the Japanese nation-state. As I aim to show, subjugation of ethnic groups in Japan, including the Ainu, Ryūkyūans, and Zainichi Koreans, hinges on not only the homogeneity myth but also the dominant geographic imaginary of Japanese territories. Neither “archipelago” nor “Trans-Pacific” is an inherently subversive geographical term, but I aim to demonstrate how both can animate alternative imaginations of space and place, as well as life and death, that move beyond the territoriality and subjectivity undergirding hegemonic Japanese nationalism. While the Japanese nation-state is already an archipelago, archipelagic thinking draws attention to the relationalities between land and sea spaces as multiscale sites of geophysical and geosocial processes. In short, the geoformal concept of archipelagoes allows me to examine the relational formations of ethnicity, nation, and empire in Northeast Asia and the Trans-Pacific, with a dual analytical emphasis on material flows and discursive forces.

The “Trans-Pacific,” as a discourse, emerged partly in response to earlier geographical frameworks such as “Asia Pacific” and “Pacific Rim” to emphasize the historical and cultural proximities and geopolitical entanglements spanning the Pacific Ocean (Hoskins and Nguyen 2014; Yoneyama 2016). As a key driving force behind transpacific studies, Asian American studies has developed enormous insights into the dynamic relationships between Asia, Pacific Islands, and the Americas through the lived experiences of Asian Americans. These transdisciplinary fields challenge the nation-centered structure of mainstream East Asian studies, which was originally

established to fulfill Cold War–era intelligence needs for legitimizing imperialist knowledge of China, Japan, and Korea (Mirsepassi, Basu, and Weaver 2003; Miyoshi and Harootunian 2002). From its birth in the Third World Liberation movement, Asian American studies has always prioritized critiques of US imperialism, global capitalism, and white supremacy that shape the lives of Asians and Pacific Islanders in the Americas. In addition, researchers have emphasized the tenacity of Asian immigrants by studying vibrant cultural productions and community mobilizations, often blurring the boundaries between the academy and the community.

Although Asian American studies offers rigorous analyses of diasporic community formations, some geographical assumptions underlying Asian ethnic identity categories largely remain unaddressed in these fields. In particular, the ethnic homogeneity of the Japanese nation-state tends to be taken for granted, whereas scholarship on ethnic formations in Northeast Asia often falls short of investigating the confluences of Japanese and Western imperialisms. As a result, although much work on Asian diasporas has focused on the deterritorialization of ethnic subjectivities, the geosocial formation of the very territoriality of the “homelands” is only partially scrutinized. Here, the convergence of transpacific studies and archipelagic studies promises a more nuanced analysis of spatialized power that flows between materiality and discourse. In other words, archipelagic thinking inspires a geopoetics that renders subjectivity and territoriality mobile, relational, and affective. Connecting the psychic to the planetary, I interrogate how dominant geographic knowledge production underscores the ongoing hegemony of imperialist operations in the Trans-Pacific. Central to such operations are the erasure and displacement of ethnic minorities, indigenous peoples, and diasporic communities. To disrupt such knowledge, I propose *counter-mapping* and *archipelagic feeling* as key methodological tools for cultivating decolonial solidarity. In the following section, I draw inspiration from previous research that attends to geographic discourse by denaturalizing space. Later, I illuminate an archipelagic historiography of imperial powers in the Trans-Pacific, before discussing how the methodological tools employed here can challenge such dominance.

### GEOPOETICS OF WATER: INDIGENOUS AND DIASPORIC CONFLUENCES

As critical geographers have established, space and place are socially produced as humans engage with, embody, remember, and imagine them interactively (Cresswell 2004; Massey 1994; Mills 2012). What may ap-

pear to be “natural” ways of recognizing and representing the material contours of space and place are innately informed by social norms. Katherine McKittrick explains that dominant geographic knowledge “materially and philosophically arrange[s] the planet according to a seemingly stable white, heterosexual, classed vantage point . . . naturaliz[ing] both identity and place, repetitively spatializing where nondominant groups ‘naturally’ belong” (2006, xv). Thus, particular spatial imaginations that uphold the economic and cultural hegemony of the dominant group become privileged, institutionalized, and naturalized, trampling over marginalized groups’ material presence and embodied experience.

Such geographic domination, as McKittrick terms it, deploys maps and place-names as technologies for epistemic manipulation. At the level of representation, cartographic renditions of material space can often aid imperial expansion by stabilizing the geophysical dynamics and naturalizing the geosocial constructions (Akerman 2008). Central to this operation is data production that objectifies materiality while privileging the dominant worldview of the researcher as the most legitimate mode of knowing. In the context of such imperial cartography, the emphasis on scientific accuracy in mapmaking is not so much representing the material world most truthfully as universalizing the mapmaker’s situated gaze. In addition to visualizing, the naming and remembering of space also contribute to the construction of place as a socially imbued process. As Amy Mills (2012) points out, place and memory rely on each other within both individual and collective consciousness. Be it crossroads or continents, place-names thus serve the function of institutionalizing a particular historical narrative as public memory.

Furthermore, these epistemological issues also shape methodological debates. Methodological nationalism occurs when nation-centered thinking pervades in social research and nation-states are uncritically used as comparable units of analysis (Wimmer and Schiller 2002). This obscures the historical and geographical contingencies of social relations that traverse political boundaries. As these scholars suggest, imperial and colonial domination thus relies on the disciplinary regime of cartographic, toponymic, and geospatial knowledge production. Through this regime of knowledge, geophysical and geosocial processes become conflated, obscured, and essentialized. Thus, territory formation and subject formation complement one another in consolidating national identity. Shared spatial imaginary and collective memory of the nation become assembled, disseminated, and inhabited as a state-sanctioned sense of self, place, and belonging (Anderson 1983; Zerubavel 2003, 2012).

To challenge essentialized national identities, drawing attention to indigen-ous and diasporic experiences can reveal the fluid relations of territoriality and subjectivity. As academic discourses, diaspora studies and indigen-ous

studies have often produced theoretical tensions. This is mainly because diasporic cultural production is often emphasized for deterritorializing ethnicity while overlooking the material relations of mobilities and immobilities in which indigenous peoples' sovereignty is implicated (see Anthias 1998; Fujikane and Okamura 2008; Smith 2011). As Shona Jackson's (2012) study of creole indigeneity in Guyana reveals, even material production in the context of slave and indentured labor can be incorporated into the claims of indigeneity by devising new creolized settler identities. Examining native Pacific societies through Stuart Hall's theory of articulations (indicating connectivity), James Clifford holds that conceptualizing indigeneity as articulations instead of authenticity "offers a nonreductive way to think about cultural transformation and the apparent coming and going of 'traditional' forms" (2001, 478). These attempts to reconcile indigeneity and diaspora achieve partial success by providing nuanced accounts of cultural processes and subjectivities that relativize diasporic and indigenous articulations. Nevertheless, they do not fully address the issue of territoriality underpinning the geopolitics of ethnic formations. Building on these debates on subject formation, I aim to show how territory formation is embedded in the entanglements of geophysical and geosocial processes.

By infusing the subject with an embodied sense of territorial belonging, geographic domination naturalizes the material and spatial configurations of power. By contrast, marginalized people's gendered, racialized, and socially stratified sense of place can be mobilized for cultivating alternative knowledge of the planet. I draw on the concept of *geopoetics* as a methodological framework for delineating how archipelagic studies contributes to a critical geopolitics of the Trans-Pacific region. A number of writers and researchers have deployed geopoetics to highlight the relationality between the geophysical and the geosocial (e.g., Balasopoulos 2008; Bouvet and Posthumus 2016; Italiano 2008; White 1992). In particular, Angela Last provides the following meditation by reading the Guadeloupean writer Daniel Maximin's (2006) articulation of humans as the "fruit of the cyclone": "Geopoetics appear as a poetics that takes geographical features and geophysical forces seriously as an element of geopolitics, while seeking to constructively reinscribe them as a means to counter imperialist aspirations and hegemonic worldviews. In short, they represent a materialist, decolonial process of rewriting geopolitics" (2015, 57). My conceptualization of geopoetics resonates with Maximin's and Last's approaches because I foreground decolonization as the axiology of geopoetic offerings. I firmly situate humans in the materiality of the earth so as not to exaggerate human agency in contrast to objects, matters, and racialized bodies that dominant epistemology renders inanimate (see Chen 2012). Geopoetics enables an

alternative imagination of the planet in which power resides in the very relationship between geophysical structures and geosocial engagements.

Envisioned as a “sea of islands” by Epeli Hau’ofa (1994), archipelagoes offer a geopoetics of water that elucidates the material confluences between indigeneity and diaspora. By shifting the lens from landmasses to bodies of water that embrace the lands, archipelagoes evoke relationality and connectivity (Baldacchino 2015; Stratford et al. 2011). According to Astrida Neimanis (2017), refiguring humans as literally “bodies of water” enables a transcorporeal critique of discrete individualism, anthropocentrism, and phallogocentrism undergirding hegemonic, and I would say mediocre, imaginations of life and living. Attending to both human and nonhuman bodies of water, archipelagic thinking thus unleashes nonbinary methodological sensibilities for water-mediated social dynamics, including differences and intimacies, mobilities and dwellings, and fluidity and solidarity. Practicing such sensibilities, the following three sections examine the emergence of Japanese and Western imperialisms in the northwestern Pacific to illuminate an archipelagic historiography of indigeneity and diaspora.

### MAPMAKING AND EMPIRE BUILDING IN AINU MOSIR

The modern Japanese nation-state consists of four main islands, Honshū, Kyushū, Shikoku, and Hokkaidō, as well as 6,848 other islands. Neither such a grouping of those islands nor a cultural identity of “Japanese” ethnicity is essential or even primordial. Japan’s current territorial and maritime claims emerged from the context of imperial expansions and competitions in the nineteenth century, through which non-Japanese ethnic societies of the indigenous Ainu and the Ryūkyū Kingdom were conquered, colonized, and folded into the territoriality and subjectivity of the Japanese nation. This national discourse was nascent during the feudal Tokugawa shogunate period (1603–1868) among elite scholars. When the emperor Meiji became the sovereign of the Empire of Japan in 1868, the modern centralized government established the universal education system and began to institutionalize the Japanese national identity. Here, I refer to the dominant ethnic group that became “Japanese” as Yamato, a group whose genealogy is entangled with the imperial clan’s rule. Briefly, the Japanese nation-state includes at least three autochthonous ethnic groups: the dominant Yamato of Honshū, Kyushū, and Shikoku, the indigenous Ainu of Ainu Mosir (Hokkaidō/Ezo), and the Ryūkyū people of today’s Okinawa prefecture.

As archipelagic thinking would illustrate, the boundaries of culture, language, and ethnic identity among these groups were not demarcated neatly




Figure 22.1. Historical expanse of the Ainu. ArnoldPlaton, 2013. Source: Wikimedia Commons ([https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Historical\\_expanse\\_of\\_the\\_Ainu.svg](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Historical_expanse_of_the_Ainu.svg))

into these island spaces. Based on linguistic evidence in place-names, researchers argue that the northern part of Honshū was at least partially under the Ainu cultural sphere (Vovin 2009). In fact, the Ainu is indigenous not only in Hokkaidō, which the Yamato previously called Ezo, but also in Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands (see Figure 22.1).

In the Ainu cosmology, *ainu* means “people”/“humans” as distinguished from spirits (*kamuy*), which reside not only in nonhuman animals but also in objects, elements, and matter, such as house, fire, water, and trees/mountains. This cosmology centered on the relationship between the human world (*ainu mosir*) and the spirit world (*kamuy mosir*). Thus, the land on which the Ainu live, including Hokkaidō/Ezo, is called Ainu Mosir. Here, I refer to Hokkaidō as Ainu Mosir, although it does not preclude other Ainu lands such as Sakhalin and the Kurils.

The Yamato gradually settled into southwestern Ainu Mosir, starting in the 1200s. While they initially traded with the Ainu rather peacefully, tensions percolated in the fifteenth century. In 1457, an Ainu chief Koshamain (Kosamaynu) of today’s Oshima Peninsula led an unsuccessful revolt against the Yamato settlers, who called themselves Wajin in relation to the Ainu. In 1669, another Ainu chief, Shakushain (Samkusaynu), organized an island-wide independence war against the Yamato, but it was ultimately suppressed. After this failed revolution, the Tokugawa shogunate gained control of most of the island and began to exploit the Ainu further by facilitating the settle-




Figure 22.2. *Nihon Kaisanchōriku-zu*. Ishikawa Tomonobu, 1691. Source: Geospatial Information Authority of Japan (<https://kochizu.gsi.go.jp/items/266>).

ment of more Wajin traders. The Yamato capitalists treated the Ainu brutally, forcing them to relocate and perform harsh labor; physical and sexual violence was rampant, and starvation was common. Paralleling the decimation of indigenous peoples of the Americas, diseases brought by the settlers also devastated the Ainu population (Shinya 2015; Walker 2001).

In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, however, Ainu Mosir was not part of the Yamato nation in terms of cartographic representations or international treaties. For instance, *Nihon kaisanchōriku-zu* created by Ishikawa Tomonobu in 1691 centers on Honshū, Kyushū, and Shikoku, while land spaces representing Ezo, the Ryūkyū Kingdom, and Joseon (Korea) appear at the periphery (see Figure 22.2).

While this maplike drawing depicts major land and sea travel routes throughout the Japanese archipelago, it also maps out local feudal lords, suggesting the cognitive horizon of the networked political and economic sphere in the isolationist Tokugawa period. Between 1639 and 1854, foreign relations were restricted to diplomacy with Joseon Korea, Ryūkyū, the Ming and Qing dynasties, and the Dutch East India Company. This map was widely disseminated, and its popularity lasted for a century until more precise maps were created. In fact, Dutch scholar Adriaan Reland obtained this map and reproduced it into a map of sixty-six regions of Japan around 1720 (see Figure 22.3).

As European imperial powers loomed closer and closer in the nineteenth century, Ainu Mosir became deeply entrenched in larger geopolitical dynamics, and its cartographic representations directly linked to the production



Figure 22.3. *Dōkoku nihon rokujū-rokushū-zu*. Adriaan Reland, circa 1720. Source: Geospatial Information Authority of Japan (<https://kochizu.gsi.go.jp/items/211>).

of Japan's territoriality. In 1800, Inō Tadataka created the first empirically measured and extremely precise map of Ezo, funded partially by the shogunate. In the 1850s, major Western powers challenged the Dutch monopoly of the Japanese market and demanded Japan open its ports. Consequently, the shogunate signed treaties with the United States and the United Kingdom in 1854, the Russian Empire in 1855, and the Netherlands in 1856. In this 1855 Treaty of Shimoda, Russia and Japan agreed on the territorial demarcation in the Kurils, between Iturup (Etorofu) and Urup islands, while leaving the status of Sakhalin undetermined. Neither Russia nor Japan recognized the territorial sovereignty of the Ainu in Hokkaidō, Sakhalin, and the Kurils; this was the moment when the Ainu world became entrapped and erased in the discourse of modern nation-states and international treaties. Russia's activities in the Far East urged cartographical needs and curiosity among the Japanese, particularly after the opening of the port of Hakodate in the Oshima Peninsula. Various cartographic renditions of Ainu Mosir were produced in the latter half of the nineteenth century, including the 1854 *Ezo kōkyōyochi zenzu* (Figure 22.4).





Mosir based on the 1800 Inō map. Throughout the nineteenth century, the Japanese expanded and fortified their territorial control of this northern region as they produced dominant geographic knowledge of the islands, shores, rivers, and sea currents of what they imagined as new frontiers. The 1875 *Shinsen nihon zenzu* depicts all the Japanese territories at that time, including Ezo, Sakhalin, and the Kuril Islands (see Figure 22.5).




Figure 22.5. *Shinsen nihon zenzu*. Urabe Seiichi, 1875. Source: Geospatial Information Authority of Japan (<https://kochizu.gsi.go.jp/items/186>).

A month after this map was published, Japan gave up its control of Sakhalin to Russia while obtaining all the Kuril Islands in the 1875 Treaty of Saint Petersburg. In light of the rising geopolitical tension with Russia, the Yamato nation-state sought to assimilate the Ainu as a buffer. The Meiji government then forcibly relocated the Sakhalin Ainu to inland Hokkaidō and the Kuril Ainu to an island closer to Hokkaidō. To complete the assimilation, the Japanese destroyed Ainu livelihoods and undermined the traditional Ainu culture while giving them imperial citizenship (Shinya 2015; Siddle 1996). The Ainu had subsisted on salmon fishing and deer hunting for food and material items, but the government banned these activities. Although the Ainu did not have the concept of land ownership, the government stole and redistributed their lands among the settlers of the former samurai class. As a method of taxation and state control, this land policy forced the Ainu to cultivate land as sharecroppers even though they had no experiential knowledge of farming. Meanwhile, traditional Ainu spiritual practices such as tattooing and piercing were banned, and the Ainu language was forbidden in schools, where Ainu children were taught to be ashamed of their culture. The Japanese government did not recognize the Ainu as an indigenous population until 2008. As I have shown here, the dual historical processes of mapmaking and empire building have consolidated dominant geographical knowledge to subsume Ainu Mosir and the Ainu under Japanese territory and national subjectivity.

## COLLIDING EMPIRES IN THE RYŪKYŪ ARC

In contrast to the Ainu, who had no centralized system of governance, Ryūkyūans (Lewchewans) had formed a kingdom by the time the Yamato power began to engulf its territories spanning across the Ryūkyū Arc. This island chain lies in the southwest of the Japanese archipelago, and it consists of 198 islands forming multiple archipelagoes between Kyūshū and Taiwan. Historical evidence indicates that the people of Ryūkyū Islands had maritime trade with people in the Chinese continent, Korean Peninsula, Japanese archipelago, Luzon, Siam, and Malacca Strait from the thirteenth century (Sakamaki 1964). The Ryūkyū Kingdom was established in 1429 under Shō Hashi, who unified the main island of the Ryūkyū Arc, Okinawa Island. The second dynasty emerged in 1469 and expanded its control to the majority of the islands in the arc in 1571. The maritime kingdom thrived by controlling foreign trade as an official enterprise, achieving economic viability in a kingdom otherwise scarce in natural resources. While the first dynasty focused on trading with Southeast Asia, the second prioritized its relationship with the Chinese continent. It maintained a tributary and suzerain relationship with the Ming dynasty, which sought to maintain its power in the western Pacific at a low military cost. A similar diplomatic

relationship continued with the Qing dynasty after the ethnic Jurchen (later renamed Manchu) defeated the Ming dynasty in 1644.

In the Tokugawa era, the shogunate permitted the feudal lord of Satsuma (today's Kagoshima prefecture) to invade the Ryūkyū Kingdom and turn it into a vassal state in 1609, although the Ryūkyūans' de facto sovereignty in the arc continued. A 1785 cartographic illustration of the Ryūkyū Kingdom and its islands, *Ryūkyū sanshō narabini sanjūrokutō no zu*, shows sea routes that connect Naha, the maritime hub of the kingdom, to Fujian on the Chinese continent as well as other islands across the Ryūkyū Arc, up to Yamato Japan (see Figure 22.6). This map was drawn by Hayashi Shihei, a Yamato military scholar, as part of a book on three countries: Joseon, Ezo, and Ryūkyū. Such a grouping of adjacent non-Yamato territories implies the shogunate's increasing imperial interest. In fact, when the Western powers approached Japan to negotiate unequal treaties in the 1850s, the Ryūkyū courts signed treaties as an independent kingdom with the Americans (1854), French (1855), and the Dutch (1859), despite being dually subordinate to Qing and Tokugawa.

Within a couple of decades, however, these treaties lost any effectivity when the Ryūkyū Kingdom lost its sovereignty in 1887; the Meiji government annexed the Ryūkyū Islands as a colony and established Okinawa




Figure 22.6. *Ryūkyū sanshō narabini sanjūrokutō no zu*. Hayashi Shihei, 1785. Source: University of British Columbia Library–Rare Books and Special Collections. Japanese Maps of the Tokugawa Era. ([https://www.flickr.com/photos/ubclibrary\\_digicentre/14612998062/](https://www.flickr.com/photos/ubclibrary_digicentre/14612998062/)).

prefecture. Juridical and military control was paired with forced cultural assimilation, particularly through the education system. Punishing Ryūkyūan language speakers proved very effective in drawing these islands culturally closer to the Yamato-controlled Japanese archipelagoes, away from the Chinese sphere of influence (Matsushima 2014). The colonization of Ryūkyū by Japan can be contextualized within the expansion of Western imperial control in Asia, much like the competition between Russia and Japan that placed Ainu sovereignty in a vulnerable geopolitical location. The major blow came from the Qing dynasty's defeat to the British in the First and Second Opium Wars (1842 and 1860). This catalyzed a series of unequal treaties between the Qing dynasty and the United Kingdom, France, and the United States, which forcibly opened major ports and transferred the control of Hong Kong Island to the United Kingdom. Consequently, the weakened dynasty was in no shape to defend the Ryūkyū Kingdom from the Japanese invasion. In response to Western imperialisms, Japan sought to expand its territory further and waged the First Sino-Japanese War. As a result of Japan's victory in 1895, Korea's Joseon dynasty became independent from Qing's suzerain control and established itself as the Empire of Korea. In addition, Qing lost important strategic territories such as Taiwan (inhabited by Han Chinese and indigenous people) to the Japanese Empire. The southwestward expansion of imperial Japan into the Ryūkyū and Taiwan archipelagoes emerged from such global competitions for the Chinese market.

Overpowering the regional hegemony of China in East Asia for the first time, the Japanese Empire then quickly consolidated its territorial control over the Korean Peninsula by waging another war in 1904. The enemy target was now the Russian Empire. By winning this war, Japan became the first non-Western nation powerful enough to pose a real threat to the European global ascendancy. With the Treaty of Portsmouth, Japan gained firm imperial access to the Korean Peninsula, parts of Manchuria, and Sakhalin—in addition to the Ryūkyū and Taiwan islands. Thus, territorial and cultural collisions between imperial powers, both “Western” and “Eastern,” led to the demise of Chinese continental hegemony and the rise of the archipelagic Yamato Japanese Empire in the age of maritime trade and militarization. From the perspectives of the Ainu and Ryūkyūans, the emergence of the Japanese nation-state has since interpellated them as indigenous subjects struggling for cultural survival and self-determination.

## COLLUDING EMPIRES IN THE TRANS-PACIFIC

Empires did not only collide into each other in the Pacific; they also colluded with one another to establish hegemony across the ocean. Japanese and US

imperialisms faced one another at Pearl Harbor in 1941, exchanging fire across the western Pacific until the Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic bombings in 1945. Aside from these four years of belligerence, the two hegemonic powers colluded to control the Pacific region through territorial occupation and targeted migration restrictions. Perceiving the surge of Asian immigrants during the gold rush as a threat, the United States passed the infamous Chinese Exclusion Act in 1882. Meanwhile, US capital flowed into Hawai'ian sugar plantations, which imported cheap labor from southern China (Qing), Japan (Tokugawa/Meiji), Korea (Joseon), and the Philippines (Spanish colony). Capitalizing on the overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawai'i in 1893, the United States annexed the archipelago in 1898. Winning the Spanish-American War in 1898 and the subsequent Philippine-American War in 1902, the United States also acquired Cuba, Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines, establishing itself as an archipelagic empire (Thompson 2010). During the Russo-Japanese War, Japan and the United States sought to avoid conflict through the 1905 Taft-Katsura Memorandum by mutually agreeing that Japan should control Korea and the United States should occupy the Philippines. Furthermore, the two archipelagic empires also sought to diffuse tensions by restricting migration from Japan, and by extension Korea, to the mainland United States in a 1907 Gentlemen's Agreement. However, Japan continued to issue passports for immigrants to Hawai'i until all Asian immigration to the United States was banned in the 1924 Immigration Act.

Endorsed by the United States, the Japanese Empire turned the newborn Empire of Korea into its protectorate in 1905 and formally annexed the Korean Peninsula in 1910. A peninsula-wide independence movement erupted on March 1, 1919, after a handful of Korean activists based in Tokyo drafted the first declaration of independence on February 8 and smuggled it to Seoul. The March First Independence Movement was violently suppressed, and some Korean communists and anarchists came to regard violence and assassination as a primary tactic. The Japanese media actively constructed the figure of "unruly Koreans" (*futei senjin*), which was used to justify the massacre of thousands of Koreans in the aftermath of the Great Kanto Earthquake in 1923 (Eda 2015). The Yamato Japanese justified their colonization of Korea by claiming that they were protecting Koreans, with whom they allegedly shared the same ethnic roots, from looming Russian dominance. This rhetoric was coupled with harsh and widespread discrimination against Koreans, some of whom internalized the oppression and actively sought to assimilate with the Japanese. Like the Ainu and Ryūkyūans, Koreans were forced to speak Japanese at school, and it became common for Koreans in Japan to use Japanese aliases to avoid discrimination. Ultimately, however, the colonial assimilation policy failed to integrate Koreans into the Japanese empire (Caprio 2009).

During the colonial period, millions of Koreans came to Japan to escape poverty. After the Second Sino-Japanese War began in 1937 without an official declaration, Koreans left the peninsula, voluntarily as well as through deception and coercion, as laborers in coal mines and construction, soldiers in the Imperial Japanese Army, and wartime sex slaves euphemistically called “Comfort Women” (Soh 2008). This colonial mass migration included some of my ancestors. By the end of colonization, some 2 million Koreans had migrated to the Japanese archipelago. The defeat of the Japanese Empire, however, did not result in Korean sovereignty because within weeks, the United States and Soviet Union agreed on a temporary demarcation line along the thirty-eighth parallel north. The Western Allied powers deemed Koreans incapable of self-governance, and Koreans’ efforts to establish an independent republic were denied because the United States, United Kingdom, Soviet Union, and Republic of China had already planned for trusteeship of the Korean Peninsula before defeating Japan. In 1948 communist activists on Jeju Island began an uprising for Korean reunification on April 3; under US control, the newly emerging South Korean police and military massacred as many as eighty thousand Jeju Islanders (Ryang 2013). In the same year, the Republic of Korea (ROK) in the south and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) in the north were successively established, characterized by their mutual nonrecognition. The temporary division has since been tragically prolonged because of the Korean War, which remains officially ongoing today with only a cease-fire agreement between the DPRK and the United States.

This postcolonial national division created a stateless diasporic community of Koreans in Japan (Lie 2008). The majority of Korean colonial migrants returned to the peninsula after Japan’s defeat, but travel restrictions, lack of resources, and homeland chaos prevented some six hundred thousand Koreans from crossing the Korea Strait, one of the most traveled water passages despite its dangerous currents. Many Jeju Islanders fled the massacre to Japan, constituting at least 15 percent of the quasi-refugee Korean population in Japan. This was the birth of the postcolonial exiles, *Zainichi* Koreans (*zainichi* literally means “residing in Japan”). After they formally lost Japanese citizenship in the 1951 Treaty of San Francisco, *Zainichi* Koreans were registered as nationals of the defunct “Chōsen” (Joseon), which commonly indicates predivision Korea. Including those who had been born in Japan, ethnic Koreans were now special permanent residents. *Zainichi* Koreans immediately organized themselves and established schools for their children to learn their own history in their own language, with their Korean names. This effort faced violent repression by the Japanese state under US occupation, which saw these schools as communist breeding grounds. The Japanese

police also sought to regain the symbolic authority they had lost in the defeat and military occupation by suppressing Korean livelihoods (Kim 1978).

Territorial conflict in the homeland extended into the diaspora and fractured the Zainichi Korean community. Some aligned themselves with the DPRK and established the socialist Zainichi organization Chongryun (General Association of Korean Residents in Japan), while those aligned with the ROK founded the capitalist Mindan (Korean Residents Union in Japan). Chongryun has since maintained an ethnic education system from primary to higher education despite political repression from the Japanese (Ryang 1997). In comparison, Mindan has tended to be more assimilationist, especially after Japan and the ROK normalized their relations in 1965, enabling the stateless Zainichi Koreans to obtain ROK nationality (but not citizenship). Because Japan takes the *jus sanguinis* approach, Zainichi Korean children cannot have Japanese citizenship by birth unless one of their parents is a Japanese citizen. Thus, four or five generations into this diasporic exile, many Zainichi Koreans remain technically stateless and disenfranchised from mainstream Japanese society.

Ryūkyūans were forced to take a similar path of compromised sovereignty under military occupation in the context of imperialist collusion. The Treaty of San Francisco indicated that the Ryūkyū Islands would be governed under a potential US strategic trusteeship, which ultimately did not materialize. When this treaty came into effect in 1952, the security treaty between Japan and the United States also became effective, restoring Japan's sovereignty and placing the Ryūkyū Islands under US military occupation—as proposed by the Japanese emperor himself (McCormack and Norimatsu 2012). The Soviet Union and China had suggested Ryūkyū be governed by China, but the internal division of China made way for the United States to establish an island chain anchored in Okinawa to contain the socialist expansion (Matsushima 2014). Thus, Ryūkyūans remained under US military occupation until 1972, with no legal or practical power to address the land theft, sexual and physical violence, vehicular and aircraft accidents, environmental destruction, and discrimination conducted by US military personnel. In 1972, the Ryūkyū Islands reverted to Japanese control, but the US military bases continued to occupy nearly 20 percent of the total area of the main Okinawa Island. Even though Okinawa prefecture comprises only 0.6 percent of the total area of Japan, more than 70 percent of the US bases in Japan are located in Okinawa (Okinawa Prefectural Government 2016). The US military takes advantage of the colonial status of Ryūkyū under Yamato Japanese rule today, controlling the land, sea, and skies of the Ryūkyū Islands with ample funds donated by the Japanese government.



## COUNTER-MAPPING THE NORTHWESTERN PACIFIC

Thus far, I have illustrated how Japanese, European, and US imperial interests have ensnared the lands and lives of the Ainu Mosir, Ryūkyū Arc, and Trans-Pacific by deploying geographic domination to naturalize Japanese-ness as a subjectivity and territoriality. My archipelagic reading of these processes reveals the historically and geographically contingent formations of indigenous and diasporic subjectivities in relation to empire building. To articulate an alternative sense of space and place from the perspectives of indigenous and diasporic peoples, I propose counter-mapping as the first methodological tool for cultivating decolonial solidarity. The original uses of the term “counter-mapping” emerged from indigenous and community efforts to manage natural resources, address environmental racism, and revitalize traditional knowledge of sacred places, and these efforts usually involved participatory processes (Hodgson and Schroeder 2002). My use of this term here is broader, encompassing alternative cartographic renditions and imaginations generally. In the Trans-Pacific region, such counter-mapping entails an archipelagic attention to the bodies of water, not as maritime extensions of territorial control but as geophysical mediators of culture. This re-visioning, I argue, has the potential to disrupt the neoliberal capitalist rhetoric of land ownership and offer instead a geopoetics of sharing the sea.

Non-Yamato counter-mapping can begin with the largest island of the Japanese archipelago, Honshū. Constituting approximately 60 percent of Japanese territory and hosting about 80 percent of Japan’s population, Honshū has been the central stage of Yamato history. However, the Yamato are not the sole autochthonous ethnic group of this island. Considering mythological and linguistic variations for delineating collective ethnic identity, Masataka Okamoto (2014) argues that the notion of Yamato ethnicity, or that of ethnicity and nation altogether, did not exist in Northeast Asia until 1888. According to Okamoto, this concept was deployed for the Meiji restoration of imperial sovereignty to invent the continuity of imperial reign since the mythical ancient past written in the seventh century. Briefly, the narrative legitimacy of the Yamato emperor comes from his alleged genealogical connection to the mythical solar-celestial deity (Amaterasu). Meanwhile, Okamoto draws attention to the Izumo region in western Honshū (today’s Shimane prefecture), where Izumo Ōyashiro (Izumo-taisha) is located. Along with the Grand Shrine of Ise, the highest-ranking Shinto shrine closely associated with the emperor, Izumo Ōyashiro is one of the most historically significant shrines in Japan. While the Yamato mythology enshrines the solar deity as the sovereign of Japan, the Izumo people have historically worshipped a different

deity more closely associated with the sea than the sun. In Izumo mythology, the deity who created the world between the heavens and the netherworld (Ōkuninushi) ceded his control of the world to the solar deity in exchange for the establishment of Izumo Ōyashiro. This myth of territory ceding is said to reflect the actual political takeover of the Izumo region by the Yamato power. To accomplish the assimilation of Izumo at the spiritual level, the Izumo deity had to surrender to the Yamato deity in the nation-building mythology. Rereading the history of those who did not acquiesce to Yamato control, Okamoto thus suggests that the Izumo people, including himself, maintained their sense of difference from the Yamato at least until the Meiji era.

Examining the Japanese archipelago through the Izumo cultural sphere further reveals the intense and complex relationalities across the northern coasts of Honshū and Kyushū as well as the Korean Peninsula. In addition to the mythological analysis, Okamoto (2014) further points out material and linguistic evidence of expansive trade and migration routes along the oceanic currents across the East Sea/Sea of Japan. In the times of maritime transportation, the northern coasts facing the continent had flourished from economic and cultural exchanges, before the Meiji government designated the southern coasts facing the Pacific as the locus of development. Therefore, as Okamoto asserts, the popular rhetoric of insularity that compels the national illusion of ethnic homogeneity does not actually reflect the material connectivities of communities across land and sea spaces surrounding the Japanese archipelago and the Korean Peninsula. Okamoto's in-depth critical analysis demonstrates the archipelagic relationalities of peoplehood in the region, including the Izumo, Yamato, Ainu, Ryūkyūans, and Koreans.

To illustrate this material and spatial intimacy of Northeast Asia, Okamoto (2014) introduces a regional map that looks upside down, placing the Pacific Ocean at the top and the Eurasian continent at the bottom (Figure 22.7). In the middle are the archipelagic chains of the Kuril Islands, Sakhalin, Ainu Mosir, Japanese archipelago, Korean Peninsula, Ryūkyū Arc, and Taiwanese and Philippine archipelagoes. At the crossroads of hegemonic powers such as China, Russia, Japan, and the United States, these northwestern Pacific archipelagoes have long been the site of imperial domination as well as grassroots resistance. In contrast to the conventional mapping, this alternative cartographic schema renders the archipelagoes more embedded and interconnected, even closer to the continent, by centering them in between the continent and the ocean. Moreover, this mapping highlights the role of the inner seas as maritime passages rather than geophysical boundaries. Although the content of the map may not immediately challenge the dominant geographic discourse, flipping the directionality can animate a different sense of space that attends to the material and cultural intimacy of these land spaces con-



Figure 22.7. Archipelagoes of the Northwest Pacific. Created by the author using Google Maps based on **Okamoto's** (2014)

nected by the sea. As Okamoto suggests, such “upside-down” maps were common in Japan before the modern cartographic conventions converged with the Meiji-era societal reorientation toward Western modernity, away from Asian backwardness. While more precisely indigenous and community-based mapping remains to be conducted, this cognitive counter-mapping can challenge the Japanese insular-imperial cartography and activate a spatial imagination of continental Asia and the archipelagic northwestern Pacific as full of pathways, engagements, and intimacies.

## ARCHIPELAGIC FEELING

A cognitive shift alone is not sufficient to challenge the hegemonic geographic knowledge rooted in the false binary between the mind and the body (and the spirit). To augment counter-mapping as a decolonial methodology, I focus on emotions, affects, and sensations that animate the geopoetics of water. To riff on this anthology’s titular focus on thinking: What would it mean to practice archipelagic feeling? How might we feel archipelagic? Although emotions may commonly appear as reactions to external factors, I think of the gerund “feeling” as a mindful and embodied practice of engaging with the

body's situatedness in space. To do feeling and sensing well, in other words, requires simultaneous input and output, reception and expression, precision and elaboration, and humility and generosity. It requires intense attention, care, and love that are at once cognitive, affective, and spiritual. Archipelagic feeling, in this sense, is a practice of engaging with the bodies of water—yours, others', and nonhumans'—with utmost compassion.

For further clues, I (re)turn to my own subjectivities as mixed (Yamato) Japanese and Zainichi Korean. Whereas both Korean and Japanese hegemonic nationalisms would perhaps reject my impure Koreanness and Japaneseness (let alone my queerness!), only a few traces of my Koreanness appear intelligible in the eyes of the nation-state. Three generations into the diaspora, I have full Japanese citizenship and only a Japanese name. None of my family members and known relatives speak Korean, and many of them, including my father and older brother, are stateless “special permanent resident aliens,” born and living in Japan. When I visit the ROK, some South Koreans would not think fondly of me for mixing with the colonizer and losing the ancestral language. Under the South Korean National Security Act, Zainichi Koreans were once prone to drawing suspicion as potential North Korean spies. I want to tell every shopkeeper and restaurant server I interact with that I am Korean, that I belong there, but I also excuse myself for not being fluent in our tongue. I want them to welcome me home, but I feel invisible and inconsistent. Instead, I let the smell and taste of the food suffice. I let the vibrant sounds of Korean as my third language constitute my skin. When I visit the DPRK, though, North Koreans make me feel somewhat more welcome as a compatriot. Between 1959 and 1984, some ninety thousand Zainichi Koreans repatriated to North Korea for the compelling promise of national liberation and material wealth, even though most Zainichi Koreans came from the southern parts of the Korean Peninsula (Morris-Suzuki 2009). For many Zainichi Koreans whose dream of national unification is written into the DPRK constitution, North Korea is the closest place to their imagined homeland. Pyongyang feels as foreign as the world could ever be, but I feel myself present at every moment. I have learned their songs, and I let my singing voice do the work. I am not entirely sure if I feel connected to anything or anyone, but I think of the Korea Strait. I feel myself flowing between Koreanness and Japaneseness to reach the open ocean, collecting all of my shipwrecked desires along the way.

I feel archipelagic when I situate my sense of diasporic longing in the history of the Japanese and US empires. Perhaps I would not have existed without these geopolitical forces, but I am as much a product of geophysical relationalities in the Northwest Pacific archipelagoes. Like Maximin's “fruit of the cyclone,” my tectonic subjectivity is as “natural” as the earthquakes, volcanos, tsunamis, and typhoons, brimming with alternative possibilities.

From this location, I seek solidarity with the Ainu, Ryūkyūans, and Oceanians, among other indigenous peoples, in their struggle for self-determination and decolonization. I draw inspiration from the figure of Ryūkyūan kayak protestors, who have staged offshore direct actions against the planned construction of yet another military facility off the coast of rural Henoko district in Okinawa Island since 2015. The Japanese government originally proposed this construction in 1996 as the only solution to replace Marine Corps Air Station Futenma in the same island, a facility referred to as “the world’s most dangerous base” by Donald Rumsfeld (Latman 2015). Equipped with life vests and paddles on vividly colored kayaks, these protestors occupied the sea surface of the Ōura Bay, whose marine biodiversity and fragile ecosystem are in danger. These protestors’ maritime and land-based resistance sheds light on the dilemma of the relocation issue, as some Okinawans and Japanese have proposed Guam as an alternative, without regard to the Chamorros’ resistance against the same geopolitical force of US imperialism. Ultimately, the only solution seems to be comprehensive and simultaneous demilitarization and pacifist diplomacy in the Trans-Pacific. With this awareness, the kayak protestors have cultivated solidarity with other base resisters in Jeju Island, where the South Korean government constructed a naval base that US naval ships would also use. The Japanese government continues to ignore the voices of the people of Okinawa and to push the construction further despite the prefecture-wide referendum expressing opposition. At the end of 2019, the government announced that the project would not be completed until 2032, adding ten more years to the five-year construction plan that was developed in 2013.

Across the Pacific, activists and community organizers of Korean, Ryūkyūan, Japanese, Filipino, Chamorro, and Hawai’ian descent in the United States are also connecting their homeland antimilitarization resistance to their diasporic struggles against police brutality and the prison-industrial complex in their local communities. Their analysis also connects the neoliberal Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement with the ever-intensifying militarization of the Pacific. The geopolitics of dissidence against neoliberalism and securitization in the Trans-Pacific, therefore, brings together various diasporic and indigenous subjectivities to foster new forms of transnational solidarity. These mobilizations emerged in the context of the post-Cold War neoliberal global order, the shifting strategic focus of declining US hegemony, and the reemergence of Chinese and Russian economies. However, these new mobilizations also draw inspiration, imagination, and knowledge from the legacies of their ancestors who fought against the colluding and colliding imperial powers. I feel archipelagic when I practice solidarity with all these emergent formations to end militarization, exploitation, and the destruction of lives and livelihoods as well as land and water.

## PRACTICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS

Throughout this chapter, I sought to demonstrate how archipelagic thinking inspires embodied methodologies for decolonial solidarity, foregrounding the connectivities between indigenous and diasporic formations in the Trans-Pacific. Specifically, reading archipelagoes through a geopoetics of water allows me to analyze the entanglements of subject formation and territory formation without reinscribing geographic domination and methodological nationalism. My attempt to provide an archipelagic historiography of Japanese imperialism reveals that various imperial powers colluded with, as much as collided into, each other across the Pacific. In this historical process, mapmaking and place-naming practices helped consolidate Japanese national identity by naturalizing the dominant Yamato worldview as the single legitimate mode of geospatial knowledge. To disrupt this geopolitical hegemony in the cognitive and affective dimensions, I propose counter-mapping and archipelagic feeling as methodological tools for centering the bodies of water and eclipsing the neoliberal masculinist rhetoric of land ownership. My aim has been to offer a nuanced framework for political solidarity among ethnic minorities in Japan—starting with my situatedness as a Zainichi Korean/Japanese writer who came of age in Asian American communities and studies. Despite the preliminary scope of this essay, I hope that my thinking and feeling contribute to the centuries-long struggles for cultivating sacred relationships in the Trans-Pacific and beyond.

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